Sky Assault on Dili

For only seven hours, on Sunday December 7, 1975, through the biggest airborne operation in ABRI?s history, the city of Dili, East Timor, was taken over. 1st Group Kopasshandha (Army Special Forces) and 18th Brigade/Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) Airborne, mostly from 502 Battalion/Raiders, East Java, parachuted from nine Air Force C-130B Hercules.

At about 05:00 WITA, BTP-5 (Battalion Landing Team/Marine Infantry, tip toed at Alor Village?s bech. With the support of gun fire from Indonesian Navy warship, BTP-5 headed the big plan of taking over the city of Dili, December 7, 1975. The operation ws the continuation of ?Operation Komodo? by Bakin at the beginning of 1975, to anticipate more political problems in Timor Loro Sae (East Land of the Rising Sun).

This prolonged political euphoria forces Indonesia to step up the operation into a limited Sandhi Yudha operation (combat intelligence) with the code name "Operasi Flamboyan (Operation Poinciana). This operation led by Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, with the Army Special Forces as 1st Group operation?s core strike force that have placed 2nd Combat Detachment at the border since October 1975, will later change into "Operation Seroja" (Operation Lotus).

Dili?s take over, preceded by this amphibious operation, was decided by Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Maraden Panggabean, December 4 in Kupang. The operation itself was executed through considerations and field analysis after observing Fretilin troop?s movement. Indonesia?s firmness was also based on the Timor Portugal people?s wish to integrate with Indonesia. The attitude represented by four parties; Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor), UDT (Uniao Democratica de Timorense), KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswin), and Trabalista, known as the Balibo Declaration, November 30, 1975. This attitude also competes against the one-sided declaration of East Timor Democratic Republic by Fretilin (Fronte Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Indepedente), two days before.

Before the struggle of Dili, Fretilin has been involved in a shoot out with ABRI troops in the struggle of Batugede Fort (October 7). Another reason, the rise of border violations interspersed with cattle thefts by Fretilin in Belu Regency, East Nusa Tenggara. The rising violations since June 1975 were frequently caught red handed by ABRI, which caused shootouts. Casualties started to fall.

Since October 1, Operation Lotus Joint Task Command (Kogasgab) has detected two Portuguese Navy frigate warships off Timor. Unfortunately, the morning of December 7, the two ships started to approach Dili?s offshore. "They have anchored nearer to Atauro Island, because that was where the escapee Portuguese government from Timor was situated," said Hendro Subroto. It might be a coincidence, at the straits separating Atauro island and Alor island, three Hercules in arrow formation one formation with there planes would make abeam maneuvers (the plane?s position is 90 degrees towards a checkpoint at the left or right side of the plane).

At the end of December 6 1975, at Iswahyudi Air Force Base, Madiun, East Java, unusually, hundreds of heavily armed troops milled about. Some wore American made T-10 parachutes, while others holds Soviet made AK-47 assault rifles. At the apron, nine 31st Squadron heavy transport C-130B Hercules, were ready to take-off. Several aircrews took the opportunity to take final check up before airborne.
The nine planes arrived at Iswahyudi Air Force Base that afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul said, he got the order to depart for Iswahyudi Air Force Base on Friday, December 5, from Colonel Pilot Susetyo, Operation Lotus Air Unit Commander. The order: after Friday prayer, all members of the 31st Squadron should be combat ready. None was allowed to go home. "I didn?t know the direction of the order at that time. But I can guess by looking at the development of the situation," remembers Air Vice Marshal (Ret) Suakadirul.
In the classified order, 31th Squadron Commander was asked to get 12 planes ready to airlift battalion of paratroopers. "So I have to get 12 crew sets ready. Pilots, co-pilots, navigators, flight engineers, radio telegraphists, loadmasters and his assistants. That?s about 120 people," he said. Incidentally two of his planes were in service, so only ten planes can be readied. For the pilots, Suakadirul purporsely stationed two senior pilots Lieutnant Colonel Pilot Siboen and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo. "As role models."

So, the next day, nine C-130s left from Halim Perdanakusuma to Iswahyudi. Three of them transported the Army Special Forces. That afternoon, in Madiun, Suakadirul received explanation that there will be airborne operation in Dili, and his fleet will transport one parachute battalion. "One plane carried 100 people," explained Hendro, the journalist who covered the incident. On the same day in Timor, 403rd Battalion/Kostrad Raiders arrived offshore Tailaco with the Landing Ship Tank (LST) KRI Teluk Bone. In the afternoon, followed by BTP-5/1st Marine Brigade Infantry entered the LST for the preparations of the amphibious landing in Dili at 05.00 the next day.

December 6, at 23.50, flight leader Lieutnant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul, started the operation by flying T-1308 Hercules. In succession, in the dark of night, eight planes left Iswahyudi Air Force Base runway. The planes moved towards Ponorogo and Denpasar, nine planes started the arrow formation with the plane?s jet exhaust and take-off light as guide.

The nature of the operation was a surprise attack. The nine Hercules formations were code named Rajawali (Condor) Flight. To maintain secrecy, radio silence was adopted during the flight. Communication between pilots was done through Morse code. The planes kept gaining altitude until they reached 22,000 feet with the speed of 280 knots. Above Denpasar, the flight leader sent a morse code to Ngurah Rai Airport?s air traffic control(ATC) informing that Rajawali abeam Denpasar. Through Denpasar, Suakadirul contacted Penfui Airport, Kupang, to inform Rajawali flight?s position at several checkpoints to Operation Lotus Command Headquarters on KRI Ratulangi submarine?s tender ship.

The slowest T-1308 was chosen as flight leader so that the other planes as wingmen can easily adjust their flight formation. Acting as wingmen were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono (left) and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo (right). Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Siboen (leader) flew the second arrow formation, two miles behind were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot O H Wello (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sukandar (right). The third arrow was led by Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Masulili consisted of Major Pilot Achlid Muchlas/Major Pilot Sudiyarso (left) and Major Pilot Murdowo (right).

Suakadirul illustrates; it was very quiet on the planes. Their breaths got heavier, understandably, this was the first airborne operation in Dili and the biggest for Hercules in ABRI?s history. Waiting was obviously boring. Especially when the target was a war zone. The flight to Dili was estimated to take 4 hours and 50 minutes. Each plane carried 42,000 pound of JP-4 fuel, enough for 10 hours and 30 minutes flight.
The broad outline, the airdrop operation to take over Dili from Fretilin?s hand was done in three sorties. The first sortie, with Dili as the target, consisted of Army Special Force 1st Group led by Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Soegito and 501st Airborne Infantry Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Matrodji. The second sortie, from Penfui Airport, Kupang, was 502nd Battalion under Major (Inf.) Warsito will follow, the target was Komoro. Especially for the Red Beret (Army Special Force), this operation was preceded by Denpur-1 (Combat Detachment), also called Nanggala-5, under the command of Major (Inf.) Atang Sutisna. The third sortie was also airlifted from Kupang.

Lieutenant Colonel Soegito divided Nangggala-5 into three teams. Teams A led by Major Atang Sutisna, in charge of taking the governor?s office. Team B led by First Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, in charges of taking over Dili Harbour. While Team C led by First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan, in charge of taking Dili?s airport. All three teams were spread in four front Hercules, with the consideration that if one got problems or hit by enemy fire, the team can depend on the other planes. That means, the operation must continue.

The troops of the second and third sorties that will be flown from Kupang were from Jakarta and East Java. Because of TNI AU?s limited ability in air transportation support, troops transportation to Kupang used Garuda Indonesian Airway?s planes. Garuda bridged troop transportation from Halim Perdanakusuma and Iswahyudi using 17 Fokker F-28 and four Fokker F-27 Friendship. Garuda?s managing director, Wiweko Supono, directly supervised this bridging operation.
To maintain the element of surprise, obviously the operation was not only based on the knowledge of the droping zone. Airstrike also played their part. Irian Jaya?s take over achieved air superiority, because it was supported by fighter planes. Bombers and transport planes must get also close air support.

On the other hand, for Dili, air fire support (AFS) was a problem. This was caused by the grounding of all P-51 Mustang of 3rd Squadron/Tactical Fighter after a series of accidents, killing, among other, Major Pilot Sriyono. While advanced training aircrafts T-33 T-Bird and ex-Australian F-86 Sabre, were not yet armed. Of the seven B-26 Invader bomber of 2nd Squadron/Tactical Bomber, only two were serviceable. There were only two pilots still qualified to fly these WW II veterans. They were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Danendra (Penfui Air force Base Commander) and Major Pilot Soemarsono, called to duty from Pelita Air Service.

During the Vietnam War the United States realized the importance of AFS. Not surprisingly, later, General John P McConnel proposed the modification of C-47 into a gunship. The Dakota was later popularly known as the Gooney Bird. It was also now called AC-47 it used to be FC-47. Twenty aircrafts equipped with three 7.62 mm machine guns at the sides, were used by USAF during the Vietnam war aside from AC-130 Spectre Gunship.

Inspired by the popular gunship, two C-47 Dakotas of 2nd Squadron/TNI AU?s Light Transport, were transformed into AC-47 gunship. Mechanics and technicians of 10th Aircraft Maintenance Depot, Bandung, installed three 0.50-mm caliber machine guns to each planes. Firing test were done along Timor Portugal border in September 1975. Two B-26s and two AC-47s were completed, ready to provide AFS for the airborne operation on the December 7.

Go!

The planes keep moving in silence. Occasionally, the sound of Morse code breaks the silence. On the east of Flores, Rajawali Flight slowly descends to 5.000 feet while arranging the dropping formation. Directly above Alor Island at 7.000 feet, the red light by the door started to flash and the bells rang three times to signal the troops to get ready.

Ten minutes left for jumping time nearing green light. Kopassandha and 18th Brigade/Kostrad Airborne soldiers attached their hooks at the end of the straps on the metal cable through the cabin. Quickly, backpack, weapons, and individual equipment? were straighened up. There was almost no noise. Everyone kept silent with his or her own duties.

Abeam Atauro, the planes reached 5,000 feet. Because the radar was tuned to the weather, Suakadirul was shocked to see two Portuguese frigates Joao Roby and Alfonso de Alburquerque anchored offshore Atauro. "There was no information on the two ships equipped with radar and sonar anchored at Atauro," protested Suakadirul. Strange. Even though KRI Ratulangi has passed Joao Roby at Timor territorial waters, October 23. What was more surprising, the existence of the ship, which has 3 100-mm guns, has already been known since October 1. "That?s what I didn?t understand," answer Suakadirul.

The doors at both sides of the planes started to open. The speed was reduced to 110 knots. "I said we were at 5,000 feet. The yellow light was on, then depressurized," said Suakadirul. The time left to the dropping zone was four minutes. Slowly, the horizontal distance between planes was shortened to about 300 feet (about 100 meters). So was the vertical distance between planes, only a 50 feet distance. "I was at an altitude of 900 feet," said Suakadirul. So if you calculate to the last plane, the altitude reached 1,250 feet.

Approaching Dili?s shore, with reference to Tanjung Fatukama, Rajawali flight turned to the right headed towards the center of Dili. To be able to fly the planes at 110 knots, according to Suakadirul, the flaps were lowered about 50 percent. For Suakadirul, Dili was nothing new. On 1970, this Chekoslovakian graduate frequently traveled Zamrud?s Dakota with Denpasar, Rembiga, Sumbawa, Kupang, and Dili as his route for RON (remain overnight). Meanwhile the navigator said, "two minutes ahead."

Nine planes appeared from behind the hills without B-26 and AC-47 escorts. The bell rang for about five seconds after the Hercules T-1308 flew across the West Side of a fishermen?s village. Suakadirul?s watch showed the time as 05.45, at the exact time the yellow light turned to green. "My throat suddenly went dry," he said.
Only seconds to 05.45, the jumping master shouted, "Ready?" Followed by the order, "Stand by the door!" Several seconds later, the jumping master shouted louder. "Go!"

Taking 260 degrees direction or almost west of the line paralleled to Dr. Antonio de Carvalho Street in the middle of Dili, the first troop jumped from the Hercules T-1308. Later hundreds, from Kopassandha and Kostrad, jumped from every plane. On the fourth count, T-10 parachutes with their olive green color mushroomed over Dili. Because Fretilin?s triangle communication between Dili-Atauro-Portueguese frigates was very good, the firts sortie?s jump has lost the element of surprise. The troops were fired upon sporadically from the ground. Fretilin?s tracers were like lightning bugs in the dark of night.

The paratroopers, still floating in the air, return fire. So, that day there was a fierce battle between airborne troops with the Fretilin. Several months earlier according to Hendro, 15,000 small arms left by Portugal were distributed by Fretilin to arm the people. In fact Fretilin was ready as soon as the lights was turned off at 03.00 at the exact time the marines started its amphibious operation supported by TNI AL?s gun fire. The Plessey radar of the two frigate ships was also obviously used to warn the Fretilin.

You can imagine the life or death struggle of the airborne troops. Not all arrived safely. Some landed at the roof of houses, stuck on a tree or fences. Those that landed in the open became easy targets. With no time to get ready, they have already engaged in battle with ex Brown Beret Tropaz, Portuguese soldiers. There was absolutely no time to consolidate. The appointed three teams, tried very hard to spread out and started the liberation operation of the governor?s office, harbor, and airport. Gun fire was heard everywhere. Even though they have known of the arrival of Indonesian troops, Fretilin?s army were scattered. If they want to wait, Indonesia could gain advantage -with careful planning because Fretilin never predicted Indonesia will strike from the air. They thought the strike would be from the border.

Because at the time of the jump the planes were fired at, plus the added obstacle of a 1,500 feet hill at the end of Dili?s runway, Rajawali flight must turn to the right towards the beach to fly back to Kupang. And because DZ was pretty short and the jump interval too long actually it took only one minute 79 out of 720 soldiers got cancelled, including Team C leader First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan.

Fires from below not only hit the troops, but also the four Hercules. In fact, a bullet that went through the plane?s body hit and killed T-1312?s loadmaster flown by Lieutenant Colonel Wello, Warrant Officer Wardjijo. Suakadirul?s plane was no exception. Bullets damaged the navigation compass and auxiliary hydraulic pump. Bullets also went through the cockpit?s glass of Suakadirul?s left side. A cup of coffee that he put, was thrown to the front of the cockpit and wet his forehead. The crew thought he was shot. Especially when they saw a thick liquid running down his forehead. "Turns out it was just coffee."

The other two Hercules flown by Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono and Colonel Pilot Sukandar were also shot. The nine planes plus the 79 troops continued the 48 minutes flight to Kupang. From Kupang, after checking the aircrafts condition, the second sorties was continued using five Hercules. Komoro was determined as DZ. Because four planes were not fit to fly, half of 502nd Batallion?s strength was not transported. At 07.45, the second sortie jumped safely at Komoro because Fretilin was hit back to the hills south of Dili. Suakadirul changed his plane to T-1305.

Wrong shot

Second sortie scrambled out of the plane. Unknown who gave the order, when still floating in the air, more than 400 Green Berets showered then with bullets and grenades. Like the first sortie, shoot-out broke out. It continued without either party realizing they were on the same side. The Marines that have beat back Fretilins along the coastline, were firing at Kostrad troops. Luckily the Marines quickly initiated to stop the shorting waving "Red and White". Even more lucky no casualities was reported.

Suakadirul found out about the miss understanding a while later. On their arrival at Penfui, Rajawali flight readied the third sortie of the remaining Kostrad paratroops jumpers to be dropped at the outskirts west of Dili. Afraid of repeating second sortie?s tragic mistake, Operation Lotus Headquarters Command decided to cancel the third sortie.
After struggling from 06.00 till noon, Dili was eventually liberated. Fretilin retreated to the hills south of Dili. Its leader escaped to Aileu. Lobato and Ramos Horta took off to Australia. Only the former Tropaz has the guts to stay. In the afternoon, December 7, the Indonesian government issued a statement that on that day, at 12.30, Dili has been liberated by Apodeti, UDT, KOTA, and Trabalista helped by Indonesian volunteers.

The next day casualities were counted. 35 Green Berets, mostly from 502nd Batallion/Raiders, including two majors and two captains were killed. From the Red Berets, sixteen were shot and killed. Three more drowned at sea. Three that was thought to be missing were found several months later. Team B leader, First Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, got hit by his AK-47 ammunition?s fragments that exploded after being hit by enemy fire. Unfortunately his superior, Major Atang Sutisna, got shot and died. "Hit by a sniper", explained Hendro. At Fretilin?s side, there were more casualties. Hendro Subroto recorded in his article in Airforces magazine, 122 died and 365 apprehended. The operation continued. Three days later, it was Baucau?s turn to be liberated.(Beny Adrian/Mouna)

UNDERESTIMATE

We were underestimating the Fretilin, that made us think it was unnecessary for Rajawali flight to be escorted," said Hendro Subroto. According to Hendro, Fretilin had MG-34 7.92 mm Spandau light machine gun. Not to mention the existence of the two Portuguese frigates. "Intelligence should have gotten the information. How could Mr. Suakadirul flew to Atauro, not knowing there were frigates down there," criticized Hendro. Hendro also pointed out friendly fire between the Marines and Kostrad as a sign of lack of coordination.

Hendro also guessed, maybe the Indonesian military believed that what happened at Padang and Pekanbaru will be repeated. At that time, when the troops were parachuted, PRRI rebels run helter-skelter. "They thought Fretilin will also run. The fact was they started firing," complained Hendro. When the Dutch massacred Maguwo on December 1948, they first dropped lots of dolls to determine AURI?s air defense force position. Then their P-51 Mustang and P-40 Kittyhawk strafed Maguwo before paratroops were dropped. Actually these two operations could be be made as references.

[Taken from ?ANGKASA?, Indonesia Space and Aircraft Magazine, no. 5, February 1999, Year IX]. Some text here might be copyrighted.