The Stealth from the Southern Hemisphere

Tu-16 Badger

Until the 60’s only three countries had long range bombers : the Americans with their B-47 Stratojet, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-58 Hustler, the British with their V-bombers Vulcan, Victor and Valiant, the Russian with the Tu-16 primarily, omitting the operators of propeller-driven bombers. AURI felt a desperate need for a long range strike capability because of the vastness of the Indonesia archipelago, the rebellion in the other islands and the American embargo on spare parts that stringled its B-25 and P-51 striking force.

“The US secretly sided with the rebels. Officially there was no embargo, but in fact out of long list of spare parts worth hundred of thousands of dollars only a single magneto for P-51 worth US$ 125,- got an export license,” complained the Air Force Chief Air Marshall Suryadarma to Lt Col (now retired Air Vice Marshall) Salatun, secretary of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff.

Because the air operations against the rebels become so intense the stock of spare parts dwindled alarmingly. Lt Col Salatun was appointed a member of our armed forces delegations which was sent to China in secrecy looking for spares. Salatun was disappointed because the whole P-51 fleet has long been scrapped, while there was only a single B-25 left, a Taiwanese bomber shot down and displayed in a museum. The delegation even met with chairman Mao Ze Dong and premier Chou-En-Lai, and instead of returning empty handed Salatun got 12 Type 56 jet fighters (license-built MiG 17), 12 Tu-2 bombers and 24 La-11 fighters (known as the Russian Thunderbolt).

“The first Type 56 fighters suffered from tail flutter, but it was duely been remedied” explained Premier Chou-en-Lai. The Type 56 fighter was excellent like the original Mig-17 and saw fine service during the Trikora and Dwikora campaigns later on. They were easily identified by the red colored numerals on the nose and the Chinese characters on their instruments. They had only one drawback : they offer no comfort during low level flying because they have no air conditioning.

The brightest side of Chinese acquisition was free of charge. The honeymoon however was soon over when President Sukarno issued a decree prohibiting foreign business and the deal was later fully charged. The influx of Chinese material eased the situation a little bit but did not alter the general situation.

It was during the precarious situation when Lt Col Salatun asked attention of Air Marshall Suryadarma to the potentials of Tu-16. “With the Tu-16 our aircrew can take-off after breakfast, reach and bomb targets anywhere in our territory and return before lunch time, a long range jet bomber is needed because there is only one airfield suitable for jet operations- Kemayoran”, explained Salatun to Suryadarma, who agreed and brought the request forward to President Sukarno.



He immediately summoned the Russian Ambassador Zhukov who later conveyed the request to the Kremlin, without visible result. Asked about the delay in answer, Zhukov told President Sukarno that the aircraft in question was still in development stage.
Salatun was ordered by Suryadarma to closely watch the development of the request for Tu-16 and was even given the authority to contact and remind President Sukarno personally if his behalf in order to prevent the process from bogging down. President Sukarno kept pressing and later discussed the matter with Premier Kruschev personally.

When in 1960 a high-level delegation under General A.H. Nasution was sent to the Kremlin to finalize an armament deal with Trikora campaign it was disclosed that under the various weapon system the Tu-16 bomber and MiG-21 fighter were included. “Because we offer Tu-16 to Indonesia, we are obliged to make the same type of aircraft available to other friendly nation” said Foreign Minister Mikoyan Wryly.

Thus AURI, the Indonesian Air Force, become the fourth air force in the world to operate long range strategic jet bombers beside being the first in southern hemisphere to have Mach 2 jet fighter.

“AURI is the most dreaded Air Force in South East Asia,” wrote the Dutch Aviation Magazine Vliegwereld. “Material-wise the RAAF is completely outclassed by AURI, the Indonesian Air Force,” wrote the British aviation magazine Air Pictorial.

When a year later the first Tu-16 landed at Kemayoran airfield piloted by Air Commodore (now retired Air Vice Marshall) Cok Suroso Hurip, it ws the first time that said bomber made its appearance before the West as such close range. It was said that American intelligence immediately reviewed their estimates of the tankage and hence of the ranges.

AURI then sent cadets to Chekoslovakia and Russia. They were Cakra I, II and III, Ciptoning I and Ciptoning II. From the 1961 all of the 24 Tu-16s started to arrive and were flown by both Indonesian and Russian pilots.

The Kennel Shooting

To support Trikora, AURI prepared one flight of Tu-16 in Morotai, 1,5 hours flight from Madiun. One of Tu-16 pilots, Col Sidjijantono said, “once a while we fly Tu-16 just to warm up the engines. But we never bombed or came into contact with Dutch aircraft,” he told Angkasa. At the time the pilots of Tu-16”s had a specific favorite target, namely the Dutch aircraft carrier Karel Doorman.

In addition to having 12 Tu-16 bombers version Badger A, under Skadron 41, AURI also had 12 Tu-16 KS-1 Badger B, under the Skadron 42 Wing 003 Lanud Iswahyudi. This type of Badger was capable to carry a pair of anti ship missile KS-1 (AS-Kennel), which worried the opponent. Six attacks of Kennels could easily send Karel Doorman to the bottom of the sea. It was unfortunate tat until West Irian was resolved through the United Nations, mediated by Kennedy’s government, the Tu-16 was never able to show its teeth.
Idrus Abbas, at time was Air Sergeant 1st class, radio operator as well as tail gunner for TU-16 said that the talk between the Indonesia Republic and the Dutch Government in UN, was one of the most scary moment and they were monitoring the talk using a transistor radio. “If the talk turns to be failure, do not hesitate to bomb Biak.” Abas continued. “We would not be sure whether we would be able to return home or not after the bombing.” Sjahroemsjah added, at the time he was an Sergeant 1st class, it was the called a “one way ticket operation”.

Tu-16 crews in Morotai could not forget how cooperative their ground crew were. “The most trouble-some was when the Tu-16 had to refuel, because it needed up to 70 drums. The jet would take up to 45,000 litres of fuel and it had to be handled manually, which would take up to four days/four nights. A test took place between 1964-1965 in Arakan island, between Bali and Ujung Pandang. An ex reporter from TVRI, Hendro Subroto, recalled that he followed the test from a C-130 Hercules with Air Force Chief Air Marshall Omar Dhani. After the launching of Kennels, the Hercules landed in Denpasar, then using Mi-6 helicopter, the Air Force Chief together with the team flew to Arakan to see the result. “Exactly the middle of the steel platform had a hole,” said Hendro.

Chased by Javelin

To be exact, during the Dwikora campaign the Tu-16 crew discovered how sturdy the TU-16 was especially when British Javelin interceptors chased him.
“They knew that we would be shooting,” said retired Air Vice Marshal Syah Alam Damanik, one of the pilots Tu-16 over Malaka Strait. Damanik recalled when Javelin chased him and his co-pilot in 1964 with Gani and Ketut, as navigators during Dwikora campaign. Gani suggested that the aircraft should head toward Kuala Lumpur, but suddenly from a base at Butterworth, the coastal of Penang, two British jet appeared and followed Damanik. Those Javelins were trying to force the Tu-16 to land either in Singapore or Butterworth. During the tense moments, Damanik ordered “the moment you see a fire being shot at us, you shoot back.”

In the meantime Damanik ws thinking fast as those Javelins were still chasing him, while their speed was higher and so Damanik showed what he could do. He increased the height all of sudden which surprised the Javelin pilots. He then hid himself behind the thick clouds to head for Medan. In the meantime Damanik was thinking fast as those Javelins were still chasing him, while their speed was higher and so Damanik showed what he could do. He increased the height all of sudden which surprised the Javelins pilots. He then hid himself behind the thick clouds to head for Medan. The tail gunner and other crew members were screaming because they were undergoing high G's when the jet shot up. But it was much better than being forced to land by the British, said Damanik.

Sudjijantono had a different story. "I was ordered to fly a Tu-16 to Medan through Malaka Strait, while in Medan there were always two Tu-16's during the Dwikora campaign. One flew southwards from Madiun over Christmas island (British territory), Cocos island, Andaman island, Nikobar, then Medan," he said. The other one used a different route, through the north through Makasar strait, Mindanao, West Kalimantan, North Kalimantan, South China Sea, Malaka strait, then Medan, sometimes surprisingly through Tanah Genting Kra.

"Although it seemed crazy, this mission was according to the instructions. President Sukarno ordered not to shoot aimlessly. Sometimes, during the monitoring period, the Javelins caught us. But the British only acted as a 'police' to warn Tu-16s not to cross over the border.

The Stealth Mission

Still within the Dwikora period, around the middle of 1963, AURI sent three Tu-16 Badger A bombers to distribute some messages in the enemy's side. One went to Serawak, the other to Sandakan and Kinibalu, Kalimantan, both in Malaysia's territory. The third had to fly to Australia. This one whose pilot was Suwondo brought equipment such as parachutes, communication set and canned food. The idea was that they drop these items near Alice Springs, Australia (exactly at the heart of the continent), to prove that AURI was able to reach the heart of the continent. "Although Alice Springs had an over the horizon radar system to monitor the whole Asia-Pacific region," said Air Vice Marshal Zainal Sudarmadji, a Tu-16 pilot from Ciptoning II. The mission called for the aircraft to take-off from Madiun at around midnight. The pilot Air Commodore Suwondo did not say much. He only ordered us to be at Wing 003 HQ at 11 p.m. bringing with a supply of drinking water." Said Sjahroemsjah, the new Tu-16 gunner who knew that they would have to fly to Australia.

The briefing was short. At 1 a.m. the aircraft left Madiun. It flew at low level to avoid the radar until it reached its destination. The F-86 Sabre, the Australian Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles were notably absent. The aircraft then reached Madiun at around 8 a.m. using another route. The other task was given to Sudjijantono and Lieutenant Col. Sardjono. They left Iswahyudi (Madiun) at 12 p.m. The aircraft reached as high as 11,000 m. Approaching dusk they reached Sandakan. While the lights were still on, the aircraft slowly reduced the height to 400 m.

After one sortie, the aircraft reversed to return to the original location. There it was dark, all lights were switched off. Sudjijantono later learnt that the British taught the people to anticipate more air attacks. Finally after all pamphlets had been dropped, they returned to Iswahyudi and landed safety at 8.30 a.m. It worked out that the total journey took 10 hours. All Tu-16s returned to the base safely.

One could not imagine in the 60s that AURI was capable of air penetrations without being detected nor caught by the defenders, not unlike NATO's stealth jets penetrating Yugoslavia.

Political conditions

It was unfortunate to note that foreign political pressure and domestic economic difficulties finally sealed the fate of the mighty Tu-16. For example, "In order for AURI to receive F-86 Sabres and T-33 T-birds from the US, we have to get rid of all the Tu-16s," said Bagio Utomo, who used to be one of the members of Skatek 042, who maintained the Tu-16.

It was undeniable that the Tu-16 was advanced for its time. As well as equipped with the latest electronic gadgets, its body was sturdy. Tu-16s were not perfect, the replacement of spare parts was sometimes difficult. "Some had to be refined and fitted manually. Some of the blisters had to be smoothen by hand." AURI later tried to sell their Tu-16s to the Egyptians but the deal did not materialize.

The farewell flight to the Tu-16 took place in October 1970. With 10 people aboard, a TU-16 numbered M-1625 flew from Madiun to Jakarta. "We almost got lost when we were looking for the National Monument (Monas)." Even up to the middle of the 80s the US government still considered the Tu-16 was a threat for its national security.

"My name is still registered as a Tu-16 pilot in Subic Bay," said Sudjijantono, from Cakra 1. Since the Air and Naval Force could not find spare parts anymore, they realised that they are more dependent on imported advanced technology than the Army. In the begining of 1970, Air Force Chief Air Marshal Suwoto Sukendar said that only 15-20 percent of the Air Force fleet remained operational, while it was 40 percent of the Navydue to the cut-off of imports of spare-parts from the Soviet Union. 1970 became a year of destructing the East Block weapons.(ben/avi/ron/sal/ida)

[Taken from “Angkasa”, Indonesia Space and Aviation Magazine, no. 12, September 1999. Years XI. Some materials here might be copyrighted]

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A SUCCESSFUL MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

The Formation of the Indonesian Air Force

When the Republic of Indonesia was born, proclaiming its independence on August 17, 1945, it has no air force, not even a single aircraft with Indonesian markings on it. Within no more than two decades the Indonesian Air Force had become the most powerful in Southeast Asia; its fleet the most advanced in the region. Here is the story of the first 17 years of the Indonesia Air Force, under the leadership of its Chief of Staff Air Chief Marshal Suryadi Suryadarma.

As soon as the independence was declared, its first president and proclamator Soekarno assigned Air Commodore Suryadarma, a navigator, to forms its air force, on September 1, 1945. A mission impossible it was, since the new born nation only had one pilot with BMP (groot militaire brevet, first class pilot), a qualification for multiengine rating, but who had no change to fly during 3,5 years of Japanese occupation. The air fleet comprised more than one hundred aircraft, the bulk of which consisted of Yokosuka K5Y1 Navy type 93 Willow training biplanes popularly known as Cureng. Not to mention the budget, which ws not even enough to purchase a linen cloth for Cureng.

Only One Pilot
When the Pacific War erupted, Indonesian only had two GMB qualified pilots : Sub Liutenants Adisutjipto and Sambudjo Hurip. The later died when his B-10 Glenn Martin was shot down by a Japanese Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusha (Oscar) Fighter of the Malakan coast. Adisutjipto too was assigned to a Glenn Martin bomber squadron but was later reassigned to the reconnassaince squadron, flying Curtiss CW-22B Falcon and Lockheed L-12. The reassignment probably saved is life, because almost all bombers fell prey to Zeros and Oscars, said Suryadarma.

Worse, there was no pilot training for Indonesian during the Japanese occupation. So, unlike the Indian Air Force, who already had 1.000 pilots when the country got its independence, August 15, 1947, the Indonesian Air Force had only one qualified pilot when it was founded, April 9, 1946. There were also several other pilots who had the Klein Militaire Brevet, but did not receive a multi-engine training yet. Among them were H. Soejono and Husein Sastranegara.

Lack of pilots but not not aircraft, AURI ( short for Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, or the Indonesia Air Force) acquired Japanese deserted aircraft such as the biplane trainer Cureng and Tachikawa Type 99 Ki-55 Cukiu which were still in flying condition at that time. Searching for new cadets, Suryadarma and AURI officers use to fly Cureng and Cukiu across the archipelago, even held an air show in Yogyakarta (1946), to promote air mindedness.

There was a story of an army officer and Cureng during the communist rebellion in Madiun, led by Muso (1948). Air Vice Marshall (Ret) RJ. Salatun told the story quoting Nurtanio, about an army officer-the name was unknown-who had to return to Kediri immediately despite the fact that all the lines of transportation were cut-off. So finally he was given a very short course on parachuting, boarded the Cureng, then bailed above Kediri. Watching him landing alone but safe and sound, the people of Kediri welcomed him and served him a half-boiled egg.

TALOA Generation
After the Round Table Conference things got better for AURI who just celebrated its third birthday. The conference held on August 23, 1949 in Den Haag, made important decisions : first, to establish APRIS (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat, or The Armed Forces of the United Republic of Indonesia) with the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesia Armed Forces) as the core force. Second, the abolishment of KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlands Indisch Leger, The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) while its multinational personnel-the Dutch, the Pribumi (Indonesian) and the Euroasian-got two choices : to join APRIS or stay with KNIL. Third, the AURI should take over all assets of the Militaire Luchtvaart (ML, KNIL’s Air Force)-the aircraft, hangars, logistics and maintenance facilities-including some of its pilots as soon as possible.

One of the assets was Andir air base (now named after Husein Sastranegara) in Bandung. It is considered the most valuable, famous as sophisticated maintenance center for piston engine aircraft in Southeast Asia. Among the celebreties
Landing there was Amelia Earhart in her famous flight circumnavigating the world along its equator (1937), and India’s Maharaj of Yodhpur whose Lockheed 10 personal plane underwent maintenance there. Andir, no doubt became the seed of Indonesia’s aircraft industry Nurtanio, now known as IPTN.

In building the air power, Deputy of Logistics Wiweko went to the United States to acquire 10 new B26 Invaders to replace the B25s. But as soon as he got there, Wiweko back home embarrassed and angry. “You know why? It turned out that the letter of credit were blank. It was later discovered that contrary to a previous plan, the budget was reallocated to buy a troop transport ship, the RI Tasikmalaya belonged to the army and which was not even seaworthy”, recalled Salatun.

As the bombers, fighters, transport planes entering its fleet, AURI became a balance air force. According to former air force Chief-of-Staff (1973-1978) Air Chief Marshall (Ret) Saleh Basarah, the AURI took over 36 Douglas C47 Dakotas, 22 B-25 Mitchells, 22 P-51 Mustangs, 18 Auster A.O.P.9, 40 North American AT-6 Harvards, 5 PBY-Catalinas, 26 Vultee BT-13 Valiants and 4 Lockheed L-12.

Watching Suryadarma built the softwares and hardwares of Indonesian air force, Army General Djatikusumo once make a comment, “the problem with Suryadarma is that he deals with a brand new field with advanced military technology. While we (the army) is still dealing with sharpened bamboos (traditional Javanese weapons) and ration food supplies, he talked about radar.”Once AURI got an offer to purchase a squadron of P-47 Tunderbolt II with all of Indonesia’s rubber supply, but the government refused to take the offer.

To catch up with man power expertise, in 1950 Suryadarma sent 60 officers to a flight training facilities at Trans Ocean Airlines Oakland Transport (TALOA), California, USA. Many of the young men made their way up to the high ranks : Saleh Basarah (AURI Chief-of-Staff 1973-1978), Oemardhani (AURI Chief-of-Staff 1962-1965), Sri Mulyono (AURI Chief-of-Staff 1965-1966). While in Indonesia, Kalijati in West Java and Kali Code now the Air Force Academy, Yogyakarta in Central Java, became the air crew training base.

“So Many Aircraft”

The former ML Officers who joined AURI were much at help during the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) uprising. When the rebellion took place, many of the Yogyakarta-graduate pilots were in retraining and transition. Former ML pilots like Otto Noordraven and RJ Ismail became famous as the ‘two man air force’. “Each of them flew many sorties between Java and Ambon in a C47 dropping logistics and weapons for Indonesian troops there,” recalled Erlangga, Suryadarma son.
When Slamet Riyadi’s regiment attacked RMS, the to ex-ML join the regiment. This time not in C-47 but in the Mitchell B-25 bombers for ground attack and reconnaissance duties. This episode however has escaped public attention.
Suryadarma’s concept was straight : the AURI had to be strictly technical military foce with no involvement in politics. His philosophy was ‘if I can do, you can do!’. Erlangga remembered his father made sudden inspections to the field to understand the real situation, recording all assets. “He would take along a collapsible bed and canteen, ready to take care him self when there no preparations to welcome the Air Force Chief-of Staff. He also never forget to bring his rifle to shot tekukur (a pigeon-like bird),” recalled Erlangga.

The AURI grown bigger and mightier. When the Asian-African Conference took place in Bandung (1955), Burma (now Myanmar) Prime Minister U Nu was amazed by the fleet of B-25s in Hussein Sastranegara airport. “I have never seen so many aircraft together,” he told Wiweko.
The international reputation as the most powerful air force in Southeast Asia region was confirmed in the early sixties by a Dutch magazine Vliegwereld (the world of aviation), while UK’s Air Pictorial quoted, “Material-wise, the Royal Australian Air Force is completely outclassed.”


Russian Planes
The PRRI/Permesta separatist Padang and Manado (1958) forced a set back for AURI. Its limited fleet flew back and forth long distance between Manado (where Permesta took place) and Padang (PRRI). Meanwhile the US embargoed Indonesia’s order of new military aircrafts. There was an effort to purchase 12 P-51 Mustang from Guatemala via an agent, assisted by India. Unfortunately the US found out about the deal right when the delivery was ready to take place and the AURI already had paid.

Desperately need additional fleet, Suryadarma persuaded the president to approve the order for Tupolev TU-16 bombers. Soekarno agreed. “I was assigned to watch the activities of the president and remind him whenever there was a chance,” said Salatun. To counter the American embargo, the people’s Republic of China as a gesture of Asian-African solidarity, made available 12 Tupolev Tu-2 bombers, 24 Lavockhin La-11s (the Russian Thunderbolt), and 12 China-built Mikoyan Gurevich MiG17s called Type56. The last mentioned saw fine service during the campaign to liberate West Irian and after.

More deliveries coming from the East (Soviet allied), including Tu-16s for AURI and cruiser RI Irian for ALRI (the Indonesian Navy). With T-16s and MiG 21s, the Indonesian Air Force became the only air force in Southern Hemisphere who operated Mach-2 fighters.

Alas, in the New Order Era, the Indonesian Air Force (now became TNI-AU, Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Udara) has to reduce its weaponaries and equipments due to the tight budgeting for defence. As long as aircraft and aerospace industries in Indonesia has not yet reach its maximum, it is impossible to talk about ideal defence concept. Because defence requires independence in the broadest perspective. (ben/ade)

[Taken from ‘ANGKASA’, Indonesia Space and Aircraft Magazine, no. 8, May 1999, Year X]. Some text here might be copyrighted.

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Sky Assault on Dili

For only seven hours, on Sunday December 7, 1975, through the biggest airborne operation in ABRI?s history, the city of Dili, East Timor, was taken over. 1st Group Kopasshandha (Army Special Forces) and 18th Brigade/Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) Airborne, mostly from 502 Battalion/Raiders, East Java, parachuted from nine Air Force C-130B Hercules.

At about 05:00 WITA, BTP-5 (Battalion Landing Team/Marine Infantry, tip toed at Alor Village?s bech. With the support of gun fire from Indonesian Navy warship, BTP-5 headed the big plan of taking over the city of Dili, December 7, 1975. The operation ws the continuation of ?Operation Komodo? by Bakin at the beginning of 1975, to anticipate more political problems in Timor Loro Sae (East Land of the Rising Sun).

This prolonged political euphoria forces Indonesia to step up the operation into a limited Sandhi Yudha operation (combat intelligence) with the code name "Operasi Flamboyan (Operation Poinciana). This operation led by Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, with the Army Special Forces as 1st Group operation?s core strike force that have placed 2nd Combat Detachment at the border since October 1975, will later change into "Operation Seroja" (Operation Lotus).

Dili?s take over, preceded by this amphibious operation, was decided by Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Maraden Panggabean, December 4 in Kupang. The operation itself was executed through considerations and field analysis after observing Fretilin troop?s movement. Indonesia?s firmness was also based on the Timor Portugal people?s wish to integrate with Indonesia. The attitude represented by four parties; Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor), UDT (Uniao Democratica de Timorense), KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswin), and Trabalista, known as the Balibo Declaration, November 30, 1975. This attitude also competes against the one-sided declaration of East Timor Democratic Republic by Fretilin (Fronte Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Indepedente), two days before.

Before the struggle of Dili, Fretilin has been involved in a shoot out with ABRI troops in the struggle of Batugede Fort (October 7). Another reason, the rise of border violations interspersed with cattle thefts by Fretilin in Belu Regency, East Nusa Tenggara. The rising violations since June 1975 were frequently caught red handed by ABRI, which caused shootouts. Casualties started to fall.

Since October 1, Operation Lotus Joint Task Command (Kogasgab) has detected two Portuguese Navy frigate warships off Timor. Unfortunately, the morning of December 7, the two ships started to approach Dili?s offshore. "They have anchored nearer to Atauro Island, because that was where the escapee Portuguese government from Timor was situated," said Hendro Subroto. It might be a coincidence, at the straits separating Atauro island and Alor island, three Hercules in arrow formation one formation with there planes would make abeam maneuvers (the plane?s position is 90 degrees towards a checkpoint at the left or right side of the plane).

At the end of December 6 1975, at Iswahyudi Air Force Base, Madiun, East Java, unusually, hundreds of heavily armed troops milled about. Some wore American made T-10 parachutes, while others holds Soviet made AK-47 assault rifles. At the apron, nine 31st Squadron heavy transport C-130B Hercules, were ready to take-off. Several aircrews took the opportunity to take final check up before airborne.
The nine planes arrived at Iswahyudi Air Force Base that afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul said, he got the order to depart for Iswahyudi Air Force Base on Friday, December 5, from Colonel Pilot Susetyo, Operation Lotus Air Unit Commander. The order: after Friday prayer, all members of the 31st Squadron should be combat ready. None was allowed to go home. "I didn?t know the direction of the order at that time. But I can guess by looking at the development of the situation," remembers Air Vice Marshal (Ret) Suakadirul.
In the classified order, 31th Squadron Commander was asked to get 12 planes ready to airlift battalion of paratroopers. "So I have to get 12 crew sets ready. Pilots, co-pilots, navigators, flight engineers, radio telegraphists, loadmasters and his assistants. That?s about 120 people," he said. Incidentally two of his planes were in service, so only ten planes can be readied. For the pilots, Suakadirul purporsely stationed two senior pilots Lieutnant Colonel Pilot Siboen and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo. "As role models."

So, the next day, nine C-130s left from Halim Perdanakusuma to Iswahyudi. Three of them transported the Army Special Forces. That afternoon, in Madiun, Suakadirul received explanation that there will be airborne operation in Dili, and his fleet will transport one parachute battalion. "One plane carried 100 people," explained Hendro, the journalist who covered the incident. On the same day in Timor, 403rd Battalion/Kostrad Raiders arrived offshore Tailaco with the Landing Ship Tank (LST) KRI Teluk Bone. In the afternoon, followed by BTP-5/1st Marine Brigade Infantry entered the LST for the preparations of the amphibious landing in Dili at 05.00 the next day.

December 6, at 23.50, flight leader Lieutnant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul, started the operation by flying T-1308 Hercules. In succession, in the dark of night, eight planes left Iswahyudi Air Force Base runway. The planes moved towards Ponorogo and Denpasar, nine planes started the arrow formation with the plane?s jet exhaust and take-off light as guide.

The nature of the operation was a surprise attack. The nine Hercules formations were code named Rajawali (Condor) Flight. To maintain secrecy, radio silence was adopted during the flight. Communication between pilots was done through Morse code. The planes kept gaining altitude until they reached 22,000 feet with the speed of 280 knots. Above Denpasar, the flight leader sent a morse code to Ngurah Rai Airport?s air traffic control(ATC) informing that Rajawali abeam Denpasar. Through Denpasar, Suakadirul contacted Penfui Airport, Kupang, to inform Rajawali flight?s position at several checkpoints to Operation Lotus Command Headquarters on KRI Ratulangi submarine?s tender ship.

The slowest T-1308 was chosen as flight leader so that the other planes as wingmen can easily adjust their flight formation. Acting as wingmen were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono (left) and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo (right). Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Siboen (leader) flew the second arrow formation, two miles behind were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot O H Wello (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sukandar (right). The third arrow was led by Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Masulili consisted of Major Pilot Achlid Muchlas/Major Pilot Sudiyarso (left) and Major Pilot Murdowo (right).

Suakadirul illustrates; it was very quiet on the planes. Their breaths got heavier, understandably, this was the first airborne operation in Dili and the biggest for Hercules in ABRI?s history. Waiting was obviously boring. Especially when the target was a war zone. The flight to Dili was estimated to take 4 hours and 50 minutes. Each plane carried 42,000 pound of JP-4 fuel, enough for 10 hours and 30 minutes flight.
The broad outline, the airdrop operation to take over Dili from Fretilin?s hand was done in three sorties. The first sortie, with Dili as the target, consisted of Army Special Force 1st Group led by Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Soegito and 501st Airborne Infantry Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Matrodji. The second sortie, from Penfui Airport, Kupang, was 502nd Battalion under Major (Inf.) Warsito will follow, the target was Komoro. Especially for the Red Beret (Army Special Force), this operation was preceded by Denpur-1 (Combat Detachment), also called Nanggala-5, under the command of Major (Inf.) Atang Sutisna. The third sortie was also airlifted from Kupang.

Lieutenant Colonel Soegito divided Nangggala-5 into three teams. Teams A led by Major Atang Sutisna, in charge of taking the governor?s office. Team B led by First Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, in charges of taking over Dili Harbour. While Team C led by First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan, in charge of taking Dili?s airport. All three teams were spread in four front Hercules, with the consideration that if one got problems or hit by enemy fire, the team can depend on the other planes. That means, the operation must continue.

The troops of the second and third sorties that will be flown from Kupang were from Jakarta and East Java. Because of TNI AU?s limited ability in air transportation support, troops transportation to Kupang used Garuda Indonesian Airway?s planes. Garuda bridged troop transportation from Halim Perdanakusuma and Iswahyudi using 17 Fokker F-28 and four Fokker F-27 Friendship. Garuda?s managing director, Wiweko Supono, directly supervised this bridging operation.
To maintain the element of surprise, obviously the operation was not only based on the knowledge of the droping zone. Airstrike also played their part. Irian Jaya?s take over achieved air superiority, because it was supported by fighter planes. Bombers and transport planes must get also close air support.

On the other hand, for Dili, air fire support (AFS) was a problem. This was caused by the grounding of all P-51 Mustang of 3rd Squadron/Tactical Fighter after a series of accidents, killing, among other, Major Pilot Sriyono. While advanced training aircrafts T-33 T-Bird and ex-Australian F-86 Sabre, were not yet armed. Of the seven B-26 Invader bomber of 2nd Squadron/Tactical Bomber, only two were serviceable. There were only two pilots still qualified to fly these WW II veterans. They were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Danendra (Penfui Air force Base Commander) and Major Pilot Soemarsono, called to duty from Pelita Air Service.

During the Vietnam War the United States realized the importance of AFS. Not surprisingly, later, General John P McConnel proposed the modification of C-47 into a gunship. The Dakota was later popularly known as the Gooney Bird. It was also now called AC-47 it used to be FC-47. Twenty aircrafts equipped with three 7.62 mm machine guns at the sides, were used by USAF during the Vietnam war aside from AC-130 Spectre Gunship.

Inspired by the popular gunship, two C-47 Dakotas of 2nd Squadron/TNI AU?s Light Transport, were transformed into AC-47 gunship. Mechanics and technicians of 10th Aircraft Maintenance Depot, Bandung, installed three 0.50-mm caliber machine guns to each planes. Firing test were done along Timor Portugal border in September 1975. Two B-26s and two AC-47s were completed, ready to provide AFS for the airborne operation on the December 7.

Go!

The planes keep moving in silence. Occasionally, the sound of Morse code breaks the silence. On the east of Flores, Rajawali Flight slowly descends to 5.000 feet while arranging the dropping formation. Directly above Alor Island at 7.000 feet, the red light by the door started to flash and the bells rang three times to signal the troops to get ready.

Ten minutes left for jumping time nearing green light. Kopassandha and 18th Brigade/Kostrad Airborne soldiers attached their hooks at the end of the straps on the metal cable through the cabin. Quickly, backpack, weapons, and individual equipment? were straighened up. There was almost no noise. Everyone kept silent with his or her own duties.

Abeam Atauro, the planes reached 5,000 feet. Because the radar was tuned to the weather, Suakadirul was shocked to see two Portuguese frigates Joao Roby and Alfonso de Alburquerque anchored offshore Atauro. "There was no information on the two ships equipped with radar and sonar anchored at Atauro," protested Suakadirul. Strange. Even though KRI Ratulangi has passed Joao Roby at Timor territorial waters, October 23. What was more surprising, the existence of the ship, which has 3 100-mm guns, has already been known since October 1. "That?s what I didn?t understand," answer Suakadirul.

The doors at both sides of the planes started to open. The speed was reduced to 110 knots. "I said we were at 5,000 feet. The yellow light was on, then depressurized," said Suakadirul. The time left to the dropping zone was four minutes. Slowly, the horizontal distance between planes was shortened to about 300 feet (about 100 meters). So was the vertical distance between planes, only a 50 feet distance. "I was at an altitude of 900 feet," said Suakadirul. So if you calculate to the last plane, the altitude reached 1,250 feet.

Approaching Dili?s shore, with reference to Tanjung Fatukama, Rajawali flight turned to the right headed towards the center of Dili. To be able to fly the planes at 110 knots, according to Suakadirul, the flaps were lowered about 50 percent. For Suakadirul, Dili was nothing new. On 1970, this Chekoslovakian graduate frequently traveled Zamrud?s Dakota with Denpasar, Rembiga, Sumbawa, Kupang, and Dili as his route for RON (remain overnight). Meanwhile the navigator said, "two minutes ahead."

Nine planes appeared from behind the hills without B-26 and AC-47 escorts. The bell rang for about five seconds after the Hercules T-1308 flew across the West Side of a fishermen?s village. Suakadirul?s watch showed the time as 05.45, at the exact time the yellow light turned to green. "My throat suddenly went dry," he said.
Only seconds to 05.45, the jumping master shouted, "Ready?" Followed by the order, "Stand by the door!" Several seconds later, the jumping master shouted louder. "Go!"

Taking 260 degrees direction or almost west of the line paralleled to Dr. Antonio de Carvalho Street in the middle of Dili, the first troop jumped from the Hercules T-1308. Later hundreds, from Kopassandha and Kostrad, jumped from every plane. On the fourth count, T-10 parachutes with their olive green color mushroomed over Dili. Because Fretilin?s triangle communication between Dili-Atauro-Portueguese frigates was very good, the firts sortie?s jump has lost the element of surprise. The troops were fired upon sporadically from the ground. Fretilin?s tracers were like lightning bugs in the dark of night.

The paratroopers, still floating in the air, return fire. So, that day there was a fierce battle between airborne troops with the Fretilin. Several months earlier according to Hendro, 15,000 small arms left by Portugal were distributed by Fretilin to arm the people. In fact Fretilin was ready as soon as the lights was turned off at 03.00 at the exact time the marines started its amphibious operation supported by TNI AL?s gun fire. The Plessey radar of the two frigate ships was also obviously used to warn the Fretilin.

You can imagine the life or death struggle of the airborne troops. Not all arrived safely. Some landed at the roof of houses, stuck on a tree or fences. Those that landed in the open became easy targets. With no time to get ready, they have already engaged in battle with ex Brown Beret Tropaz, Portuguese soldiers. There was absolutely no time to consolidate. The appointed three teams, tried very hard to spread out and started the liberation operation of the governor?s office, harbor, and airport. Gun fire was heard everywhere. Even though they have known of the arrival of Indonesian troops, Fretilin?s army were scattered. If they want to wait, Indonesia could gain advantage -with careful planning because Fretilin never predicted Indonesia will strike from the air. They thought the strike would be from the border.

Because at the time of the jump the planes were fired at, plus the added obstacle of a 1,500 feet hill at the end of Dili?s runway, Rajawali flight must turn to the right towards the beach to fly back to Kupang. And because DZ was pretty short and the jump interval too long actually it took only one minute 79 out of 720 soldiers got cancelled, including Team C leader First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan.

Fires from below not only hit the troops, but also the four Hercules. In fact, a bullet that went through the plane?s body hit and killed T-1312?s loadmaster flown by Lieutenant Colonel Wello, Warrant Officer Wardjijo. Suakadirul?s plane was no exception. Bullets damaged the navigation compass and auxiliary hydraulic pump. Bullets also went through the cockpit?s glass of Suakadirul?s left side. A cup of coffee that he put, was thrown to the front of the cockpit and wet his forehead. The crew thought he was shot. Especially when they saw a thick liquid running down his forehead. "Turns out it was just coffee."

The other two Hercules flown by Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono and Colonel Pilot Sukandar were also shot. The nine planes plus the 79 troops continued the 48 minutes flight to Kupang. From Kupang, after checking the aircrafts condition, the second sorties was continued using five Hercules. Komoro was determined as DZ. Because four planes were not fit to fly, half of 502nd Batallion?s strength was not transported. At 07.45, the second sortie jumped safely at Komoro because Fretilin was hit back to the hills south of Dili. Suakadirul changed his plane to T-1305.

Wrong shot

Second sortie scrambled out of the plane. Unknown who gave the order, when still floating in the air, more than 400 Green Berets showered then with bullets and grenades. Like the first sortie, shoot-out broke out. It continued without either party realizing they were on the same side. The Marines that have beat back Fretilins along the coastline, were firing at Kostrad troops. Luckily the Marines quickly initiated to stop the shorting waving "Red and White". Even more lucky no casualities was reported.

Suakadirul found out about the miss understanding a while later. On their arrival at Penfui, Rajawali flight readied the third sortie of the remaining Kostrad paratroops jumpers to be dropped at the outskirts west of Dili. Afraid of repeating second sortie?s tragic mistake, Operation Lotus Headquarters Command decided to cancel the third sortie.
After struggling from 06.00 till noon, Dili was eventually liberated. Fretilin retreated to the hills south of Dili. Its leader escaped to Aileu. Lobato and Ramos Horta took off to Australia. Only the former Tropaz has the guts to stay. In the afternoon, December 7, the Indonesian government issued a statement that on that day, at 12.30, Dili has been liberated by Apodeti, UDT, KOTA, and Trabalista helped by Indonesian volunteers.

The next day casualities were counted. 35 Green Berets, mostly from 502nd Batallion/Raiders, including two majors and two captains were killed. From the Red Berets, sixteen were shot and killed. Three more drowned at sea. Three that was thought to be missing were found several months later. Team B leader, First Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, got hit by his AK-47 ammunition?s fragments that exploded after being hit by enemy fire. Unfortunately his superior, Major Atang Sutisna, got shot and died. "Hit by a sniper", explained Hendro. At Fretilin?s side, there were more casualties. Hendro Subroto recorded in his article in Airforces magazine, 122 died and 365 apprehended. The operation continued. Three days later, it was Baucau?s turn to be liberated.(Beny Adrian/Mouna)

UNDERESTIMATE

We were underestimating the Fretilin, that made us think it was unnecessary for Rajawali flight to be escorted," said Hendro Subroto. According to Hendro, Fretilin had MG-34 7.92 mm Spandau light machine gun. Not to mention the existence of the two Portuguese frigates. "Intelligence should have gotten the information. How could Mr. Suakadirul flew to Atauro, not knowing there were frigates down there," criticized Hendro. Hendro also pointed out friendly fire between the Marines and Kostrad as a sign of lack of coordination.

Hendro also guessed, maybe the Indonesian military believed that what happened at Padang and Pekanbaru will be repeated. At that time, when the troops were parachuted, PRRI rebels run helter-skelter. "They thought Fretilin will also run. The fact was they started firing," complained Hendro. When the Dutch massacred Maguwo on December 1948, they first dropped lots of dolls to determine AURI?s air defense force position. Then their P-51 Mustang and P-40 Kittyhawk strafed Maguwo before paratroops were dropped. Actually these two operations could be be made as references.

[Taken from ?ANGKASA?, Indonesia Space and Aircraft Magazine, no. 5, February 1999, Year IX]. Some text here might be copyrighted.

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